96 ideas
| 8558 | One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker] |
| 8559 | Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker] |
| 8594 | People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared [Shoemaker] |
| 10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
| 10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
| 23445 | Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo] |
| 10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
| 10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
| 10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
| 10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
| 10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
| 10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
| 10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
| 10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
| 10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
| 23447 | In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo] |
| 15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
| 23443 | The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo] |
| 23444 | To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo] |
| 23446 | You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo] |
| 23448 | Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo] |
| 14085 | 'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo] |
| 14084 | Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo] |
| 14086 | 'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo] |
| 14087 | 'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo] |
| 14089 | Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo] |
| 14083 | Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo] |
| 14090 | In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo] |
| 23441 | Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo] |
| 23442 | Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo] |
| 14091 | There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo] |
| 8596 | Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal [Shoemaker] |
| 8597 | We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep [Shoemaker] |
| 10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
| 10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
| 15092 | Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker] |
| 15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
| 15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
| 14088 | An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo] |
| 8543 | Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker] |
| 8551 | Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker] |
| 8557 | To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker] |
| 15761 | We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker] |
| 15756 | Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker] |
| 15758 | Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker] |
| 8547 | One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker] |
| 8549 | Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker] |
| 15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
| 12678 | Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis] |
| 8545 | A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker] |
| 15757 | 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker] |
| 15759 | The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker] |
| 15760 | Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker] |
| 15762 | Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker] |
| 8552 | If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker] |
| 4040 | The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker] |
| 15765 | Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker] |
| 14534 | Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 8548 | Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker] |
| 9485 | Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird] |
| 8550 | Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker] |
| 10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
| 16235 | Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
| 14753 | The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider] |
| 16072 | 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
| 14751 | Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider] |
| 16071 | Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
| 16234 | Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
| 13278 | Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki] |
| 14750 | Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider] |
| 8555 | There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker] |
| 15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
| 8554 | Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker] |
| 15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
| 15764 | 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker] |
| 15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
| 15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
| 8562 | It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker] |
| 5691 | The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker] |
| 8593 | Maybe billions of changeless years have elapsed since my last meal [Shoemaker] |
| 8556 | Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker] |
| 15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
| 5687 | For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker] |
| 5688 | Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker] |
| 1389 | If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker] |
| 1390 | Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG] |
| 10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
| 8542 | If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker] |
| 8598 | If things turn red for an hour and then explode, we wouldn't say the redness was the cause [Shoemaker] |
| 15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
| 8560 | If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
| 15763 | If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker] |
| 8561 | If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker] |
| 8553 | It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker] |
| 4226 | If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Shoemaker, by Lowe] |
| 8595 | If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years [Shoemaker] |